Endogenous Rules, Risk & Legal Institutions Workshop

The first Endogenous Rules, Risk & Legal Institutions Workshop will be hosted this year on February 21-22, 2020 at Claremont Graduate University. The workshop will run from 9:00am – 5:00pm on February 21 and 9:00am – 2:00pm on February 22, as well as a group dinner on February 21.

 

Workshop Description

Although societies, groups and organizations often deliberate over and develop sets of laws and rules, the application of these rules often differ from what is codified. This is particularly true for legal institutions where legal precedent, norms and extra-legal pressures can result in legal actors developing informal sets of rules or procedures. Such endogenous rules and legal institutions are used in carrying out everyday tasks in the criminal justice system. The evolution of these rules or heuristics can have a considerable impact on legal outcomes, but can be difficult to discern without deep knowledge of the incentives faced by the relevant decision-makers. Examples of such rules include:

  • The relationship between bail decisions and prior criminal behavior
  • Pre-screening for individuals admitted into diversionary programs
  • The pressures on and promises of elected positions to change existing practices
  • Plea bargaining through the lens of the Courtroom Workgroup
  • The role of collaborative courts in reducing recidivism
  • The response of local-level criminal justice actors to imposed higher-level policies

The goal of this workshop is to showcase recent contributions that enhance our understanding of endogenous rules within legal institutions. By design, we want the workshop to be interdisciplinary and open to any methodological approach. Submit your abstract/paper or register for the event by simply emailing computationaljusticelab@gmail.com.

 

Special Issue of Constitutional Political Economy  on “Behavioral Approaches to Economic Governance”

Guest edited by Greg DeAngelo and Rustam Romaniuc

This year marks the tenth anniversary of Elinor Ostrom receiving the Nobel Prize in economics, along with Oliver E. Williamson, “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons.” In her work, Ostrom demonstrated, contrary to conventional thinking, that communities can self-organize. Examining dozens of real-world arrangements, Ostrom showed how diverse organizations and rules devised by community members help them avoid tragic outcomes without any regulation by state authorities or privatization. Her findings from the field and laboratory experiments challenged the core assumptions of microeconomics, as well as those of political economists. Moreover, this work has been seminal in generating new, innovative research. The aim of this special issue is to highlight advancements in spontaneous order and governance. We invite submissions that investigate the existence of multiple forms of governance for collective action from a behavioral perspective (empirically or theoretically). We particularly welcome original experimental work that takes a comparative perspective on self-governance. The special issue will appear in Constitutional Political Economy.

The submission deadline is March 1, 2020.

To be considered for publication in the special issue, please submit your manuscript online via Constitutional Political Economy’s online submission and editorial system, and select article type “Behavioral Approaches to Economic Governance”.

Special issue editors: Gregory DeAngelo (Claremont Graduate University) and Rustam Romaniuc (Claremont Graduate University). Should you have any questions, please contact Greg DeAngelo (gregory.deangelo@gmail.com) or Rustam Romaniuc (rustam.romaniuc@gmail.com) about the substance of the special issue.